Pour soutenir les élèves du primaire dans leur apprentissage de la langue et des disciplines scolaires, tant en contexte de français langue d’enseignement que de français langue seconde, l’élaboration d’une liste de vocabulaire dit « transdisciplinaire » (Hiebert et Lubliner 2008) s’avère nécessaire. Il n’existe en effet pas de liste de référence pour l’enseignement ciblé des mots qui apparaissent fréquemment dans les matières scolaires au primaire en français et qui ont comme caractéristiques : soit d’être utilisés dans un même sens (...) quelle que soit la matière (souligner, examiner, répondre, expliquer, premièrement, enfin, etc.), soit de posséder des sens différents dans les différentes disciplines et dans la langue (nombre, base, somme, résultat, valeur, représenter, etc.). Dans cet article, nous rendons compte d’un projet de recherche ayant mené 1) à la constitution d’un corpus de plus de 4 millions de mots, à partir de manuels scolaires en usage au Québec pour tous les cycles du primaire, dans cinq disciplines (français, mathématiques, sciences, univers social, éthique et culture religieuse) et 2) à la sélection d’une liste de vocabulaire transdisciplinaire de plus de 2 000 vocables à des fins d’enseignement de la langue et des disciplines scolaires. (shrink)

Cette recension a déjà paru dans Critique d'art, le 4 novembre 2014. Renate LORENZ, Not Now! Now! Chronopolitics, Art & Research, Berlin, Sternberg Press, 2014, 187 p. Not Now! Now! prolonge les réflexions engagées lors du colloque international éponyme à l'Academy of Fine Arts de Vienne en 2013 qui réunissait théoriciens et artistes autour des chronopolitics. Si la durée, le rythme et l'ordonnancement du temps sont des enjeux majeurs dans la compréhension des évènements - Recensions.

ABSTRACT This article examines the resonance of Robert Owen’s ideas in the field of women’s rights with the view to determining the extent of their dissemination in transnational networks. The article focuses on the life and work of Anna Doyle Wheeler, which offers an important, though understudied, case for exploring early feminist circles, and, as she was a friend of Owen’s and one of his earliest supporters from the 1820s onwards, the impact of Owen’s ideas within these circles. The article (...) traces Wheeler’s discovery of Owen’s system and examines how Wheeler fused Owen’s co-operative ideals with calls for women’s emancipation. It analyses her famous Appeal of One Half of the Human Race (1825), a work that urged women to engage ardently in the battle for their political and civil rights, and to join in the establishment of co-operative communities. The article concludes by examining how Wheeler attempted to articulate and put into practice these political and co-operative principles through her involvement in the English, French and Irish co-operative movements, and through her association with Désirée Véret and the contributors to the Tribune des femmes. (shrink)

This special issue of the _ Revue d’études benthamiennes _ aims to examine the transmission and reception of utilitarian thought among various socialist movements in the nineteenth century, to shed light on their emergence, uses and legacy. By focusing on the originality and variety of these socialist reinterpretations, it builds upon renewed approaches in intellectual and political history that have successfully challenged the classical distinction between “utopian” and “scientific” socialism. Consequently, this issue brings a corrective to the tendency, on the (...) part of established scholarship, to confine Bentham’s influence to classical liberalism. Though the contributions to this issue focus on three European countries (Britain, Ireland and France), it is hoped that they will provide a first step towards a more general, joint history of the relation between utilitarianism and socialism. (shrink)

The prominent Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky and his ex-student Nicolai Hartmann shared many metaphysical and epistemological views, and Lossky is likely to have influenced Hartmann in adopting several of them. But, in the case of axiological issues, it appears that Lossky also borrowed from the axiologies of Hartmann and the latter's Cologne colleague, Max Scheler. The links between the theories of values of Scheler and Hartmann have been studied abundantly, but never in relation to Lossky. In this paper, I examine (...) the manifold relationships – similarities, differences, borrowings, criticisms, and possible influences – between Lossky's axiology and those of Scheler and Hartmann on four key interweaving issues: (1) their ontological realism with regards to the objectivity of values, (2) their epistemological theories of the intuition of values, (3) their ontological definitions of "value", i.e., whether values are relations, qualities, essences, powers, meanings, etc., and (4) their theories of the stratification of values. (shrink)

Those who criticize as well as those who nowadays defend constructivism in metaethics consider John Rawls’s constructivism to be incomplete. According to them, his ontological agnosticism makes evident this incompleteness; I question this widely accepted charge. I propose an alternative interpretation, according to which Rawls’s agnosticism is the effect of his metaethics rather than a lack of metaethics. Thanks to this interpretation, I question the originality and attractiveness of Rawls’s metaethics. My claim is that Rawls’s metaethics adequately captures the specific (...) historical nature of political norms. (shrink)

This paper assesses James M. Buchanan's claim of following a positive approach in stark contrast to the normative approach to public finance of Richard A. Musgrave. The goal of this paper is to shed light on the foundations of modern American public finance by analysing one aspect of the methodology of its two most prominent fathers. I show (1) that it is difficult to distinguish Musgrave's and Buchanan's theories of public goods along the positive/normative dividing line and (2) that Buchanan's (...) theory can also be considered normative. In the first three parts, I follow the Weberian methodological tradition in looking for value judgements in the theories, and by reflecting on the nature of ideal types. In the last part, I propose a broader interpretation of Buchanan's methodological stance within the academic context of the 1960s. (shrink)

This paper aims to deflate the idea that democracy would be in essence a privileged locus of civic trust. Three claims are defended: (1) there is nothing specific to democracy regarding the affirmation that trust is required for social cooperation; (2) democracy, when conceived discursively, depends on guarded epistemic trust and; (3) popular control may require, in some contexts, institutions that express and foster distrust towards a specific section of the population. The conclusion to be drawn is that the appropriateness (...) of trust for the achievement of popular control over government depends on a contextual and realist assessment. (shrink)

This is a translation of the obituary that Nicolai Hartmann wrote for his colleague and friend, Max Scheler, after the latter's premature death in 1928. In this eulogy, after emphasizing the unfortunate incompleteness of Scheler's lifework, his keeping abreast with the development of the various sciences, his power of intuition, and the fact that he was a philosopher of life without for that matter having a Lebensphilosophie, Hartmann chronologically recapitulates Scheler's life achievements, beginning with his career in Jena, his interest (...) for ethical principles, his relation to the phenomenological movement in Munich, his theory of values, wartime in Berlin, his work on the sociology of knowledge, he gives us glimpses into Scheler's unwritten and still fluctuating metaphysical views, his ever-growing interest in ontological questions, which was guided by his continued interest in the problem of man, his power of relearning, and the apparent contradictions in his thought, which, Hartmann says, was primarily the thought of a "problemthinker." The original German text was first published in Kant-Studien: Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft, vol. 33, n. 1/2, 1928, pp. ix‒xvi. The original pagination is indicated in angle brackets. (shrink)

The politics of reconciliation, in Canada, finds its origin in judgements of the Supreme Court affirming the objective of reconciling the sui generis authority and continued distinct existence of I...

The politics of reconciliation, in Canada, finds its origin in judgements of the Supreme Court affirming the objective of reconciling the sui generis authority and continued distinct existence of I...

Yann Allard-Tremblay ,Aude Bandini | : Les théories épistémiques et délibératives de la démocratie soulignent l’importance du processus de la délibération quand l’objectif poursuivi est de parvenir à de bonnes décisions. Dans cet article, nous nous intéresserons aux différents mécanismes grâce auxquels une délibération publique à la fois ouverte, libre et inclusive, peut parvenir à de bonnes décisions, avant d’envisager ce que la délibération peut apporter en cas de désaccord. Nous nous concentrerons plus particulièrement ici sur la fonction constructive (...) de la démocratie, c’est-à-dire sur cette capacité qu’a la démocratie délibérative d’identifier et de formuler, de manière épistémiquement instructive, les problèmes de justice auxquels doit faire face le corps politique. Il faudra donc d’abord expliquer comment la démocratie permet de colliger l’information et de la mettre à disposition de chacun, afin d’expliquer ensuite comment la délibération peut permettre l’émergence d’accords entre les individus. Nous verrons alors que la délibération a des limites, et pourquoi elle se révèle incapable de surmonter certains désaccords. Nous tâcherons enfin d’expliquer le rôle qu’elle joue dans la formulation des désaccords politiques. Sur ce point, nous montrerons que la délibération permet d’éviter que ne surgissent des désaccords politiques insoutenables, qui mettraient en péril l’intégrité du corps politique. | : Deliberative epistemic theories of democracy highlight the importance of deliberation for the achievement of correct decisions. The aims of this paper are to discuss the mechanisms which allow an open, free and inclusive forum of deliberation to achieve correct decisions and to discuss the impact of deliberation on disagreement. I concentrate on the constructive function of democracy which designates the capacity of deliberative democracy to identify and frame the problems of justice faced by a polity in epistemically positive ways. I first explain how democracy can pool information. This is then used to explain how deliberation can enable agreement to emerge. This is followed by a discussion of the limits of deliberation and how it is unable to resolve some disagreements. The final element of my discussion is an explanation of the role of deliberation in framing political disagreements. I argue that deliberation helps in avoiding unsustainable political disagreements which could bring about political decay. (shrink)

On doit à l’économiste américain d’origine allemande, Richard A. Musgrave, la formulation des critères d’Équité Horizontale (ÉH) et d’Équité Verticale (ÉV). Étant donnée une base fiscale, l’ÉH veut que les égaux soient traités également, alors que l’ÉV exige que les inégaux soient traités inégalement (par exemple que les plus riches payent proportionnellement plus d’impôts). Musgrave opère en 1959 une redescription créative de considérations d’équité qui ont une longue histoire de Hobbes à Buchanan, en passant notamment par la fameuse maxime de (...) Adam Smith. La reconstruction généalogique montre que l’ÉV et l’ÉH relèvent de la justice distributive au sens aristotélicien du terme. Un critère purement formel, l’équité en matière d’impôt signifie l’égalité proportionnelle dans la répartition des charges communes à tous les individus membres d’une communauté politique. À défaut d’un consensus théorique sur la manière de conceptualiser les contribuables, l’ÉH conserve tout de même une valeur de principe régulateur dans le cadre non idéal de débats de réforme fiscale.Codes JEL : H20, B11, B12, B20, B40, D63. (shrink)

In Liberalism's Religion, Cécile Laborde claims that public reason has to be broadened. She rejects the criterion of shareability and advocates for the criterion of accessibility. Such a broadening seems to break with an orthodox political liberalism. This paper seeks to highlight the reasons why Laborde prefers the criterion of accessibility to its rivals. My claim is that, far from leading Laborde out from the liberal side, her views show that she understands the liberals better than they understand themselves. Ultimately, (...) I make a few suggestions on how to better structure the political debate once public reason has been broadened. (shrink)

What does the renewal of republicanism mean? Are we, as a lot of people think, to understand republicanism as a real alternative to political liberalism? Is republicanism perfectly distinct from political liberal? Is it able to avoid its pitfall? This paper addresses these questions, focusing on the case of freedom of conscience. Through a dialogue between Rawls’s political liberalism and Cécile Laborde’s critical republicanism, I explain why republicanism claims it overcomes political liberalism. Nevertheless, I emphasise on the fact that a (...) perfectionist interpretation of republicanism presents some difficulties and I propose an alternative neutralist interpretation. However, such an interpretation calls into question the idea that republicanism is an alternative to political liberalism. (shrink)

The following text is a translation of Semyon Frank’s “L’intuition fondamentale de Bergson” published in Henri Bergson: Essais et témoignages inédits, edited by Albert Béguin and Pierre Thévenaz, Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1941. In this article, Frank addresses Bergson’s notion of intuition, his anti-intellectualism, his mysticism, his closeness to Lebensphilosophie, the notion of lived experience, the distinction between intuition as pure contemplation and intuition as living knowledge, the distinction between cognition of the atemporal essence of reality and cognition of (...) the world of becoming, pragmatism, the disinterested and open intuitive spiritual attitude vs the utilitarian attitude of social groups closed in on themselves, the transrational vs the irrational, spiritual life, psychic life, the Absolute, and the temporal flux. The article contains criticisms of Bergson on the issues of time and intuition: the durée, the intuitive time, is incomprehensible without an atemporal foundation. Therefore, according to Frank, Plato was correct—contra Bergson—to define time as the moving image of eternity. And, if there is such an atemporal foundation, then, contrary to what Bergson seems to think, intuition as living knowledge cannot be the sole mode of intuition. Moreover, unlike what Bergson appears to think, an intuition of the Absolute would be an intuition of the transrational rather than of the irrational. The translation is preceded by an introduction tracing the genesis of the article, which was commissioned by the Swiss philosopher Pierre Thévenaz. (shrink)

This paper presents a conception of corruption informed by epistemic democratic theory. I first explain the view of corruption as a disease of the political body. Following this view, we have to consider the type of actions that debase a political entity of its constitutive principal in order to assess corruption. Accordingly, we need to consider what the constitutive principle of democracy is. This is the task I undertake in the second section where I explicate democratic legitimacy. I present democracy (...) as a procedure of social inquiry about what ought to be done that includes epistemic and practical considerations. In the third section, I argue that the problem of corruption for a procedural conception of democracy is that the epistemic value of the procedure is diminished by corrupted agents’ lack of concern for truth. Corruption, according to this view, consists in two deformities of truth: lying and bullshit. These deformities corrupt since they conceal private interests under the guise of a concern for truth. In the fourth section, I discuss the difficulties a procedural account may face in formulating solutions to the problem of corruption. (shrink)

Dans le Mali des années 1960-1970, la question de la sexualité des élèves du secondaire a constitué un enjeu politique crucial. Alors qu’émergeait en milieu urbain « une culture juvénile adolescente » favorisée par la sociabilité scolaire, l’idéal d’une jeunesse disciplinée et aux ordres du Parti accentua l’encadrement des comportements juvéniles et la traque de leurs relations charnelles. En examinant l’évolution des dispositifs de contrôle de la sexualité juvénile au cours de ces deux décennies, cet article montre comment l’autonomie sexuelle (...) des scolaires a suscité des peurs profondément genrées auxquelles des réponses diverses furent apportées. On observe ainsi le passage d’une gestion exclusivement répressive à un encadrement sanitaire et éducatif faisant reposer sur les filles – plus que sur les garçons – l’intériorisation des normes et des recommandations en matière de comportements sexuels. (shrink)

The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the thesis, (...) I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure. (shrink)

This paper offers a revised political conception of human rights informed by legal pluralism and epistemic considerations. In the first part, I present the political conception of human rights. I then argue for four desiderata that such a conception should meet to be functionally applicable. In the rest of the first section and in the second section, I explain how abstract human rights norms and the practice of specification prevent the political conception from meeting these four desiderata. In the last (...) part of the paper, I argue that full-fledged tolerance in the international order – that is tolerance-as-non-intervention and tolerance-as-respect – should be attached to (1) compliance with jus cogens norms and to; (2a) a political community recognizably organized as a community of inquiry that is; (2b) committed to the specification and incorporation or expression of the idea of human rights within its local legal system. (shrink)

This article provides an exploration of the relationships between a procedural account of epistemic democracy, illegitimate laws and judicial review. I first explain how there can be illegitimate laws within a procedural account of democracy. I argue that even if democratic legitimacy is conceived procedurally, it does not imply that democracy could legitimately undermine itself or adopt grossly unjust laws. I then turn to the legitimacy of judicial review with regard to these illegitimate laws. I maintain that courts do not (...) have a moral privilege on the overthrow of illegitimate laws; in this respect the refusal of royal assent has the same status. I also explain how the rule of the clear mistake fails to restrict the action of courts to only illegitimate laws. Finally, I argue for the positive epistemic inputs of weak judicial review. (shrink)

This paper argues that Epictetus’ ethics involves three features which are also present in Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics: 1) A major problem for agents is when they fail to render a universal premise effective at motivating a particular action in accordance with that premise. 2) There are two reasons this occurs: Precipitancy and Weakness. 3) Precipitancy and Weakness can be prevented by gaining a fuller understanding of our beliefs and commitments. This comparison should make clear that (...) akrasia is certainly not absent from Epictetus. Rather a very Aristotelian understanding of why we fail to act in accordance with what we take to be in our own best interests remains at the center of his ethics. (shrink)

How should a political society be structured so as to legitimately distribute political power? One principle advanced to answer this question is the principle of subsidiarity. According to this principle, the default locus of political power is with the lowest competent political unit. This article argues that subsidiarity is a structural principle of a conception of political legitimacy informed by epistemic considerations. Broadly, the argument is that political societies organised according to the principle of subsidiarity can more effectively achieve political (...) decisions that can justifiably appear to be correct from the point of view of those subject to them. The article presents two considerations in order to establish a pro tanto case for acting separately before presenting five additional epistemic considerations that establish a prima facie case for acting separately. The article then shows that political legitimacy and the epistemic aim of decision-making can sometimes be served more effectively and efficiently by allowing higher-level political units to assist lower-level political units. (shrink)

I aim to explain why majority voting can be assumed to have an epistemic edge over lottery voting. This would provide support for majority voting as the appropriate decision mechanism for deliberative epistemic accounts of democracy. To argue my point, I first recall the usual arguments for majority voting: maximal decisiveness, fairness as anonymity, and minimal decisiveness. I then show how these arguments are over inclusive as they also support lottery voting. I then present a framework to measure accuracy so (...) as to compare the two decision mechanisms. I go over four arguments for lottery voting and three arguments for majority voting that support their respective accuracy. Lottery voting is then shown to have, compared to majority voting, a decreased probability of discrimination. That is, I argue that with lottery voting it is less probable under conditions of normal politics that if the procedure selects X, X is reasonable. I then provide two case scenarios for each voting mechanism that illustrate my point. (shrink)

The world of insects is at once beneath our feet and unfathomably alien. Small and innumerable, insects surround and disrupt us even as we scarcely pay them any mind. Insects confront us with the limits of what is imaginable, while at the same time being essential to the everyday functioning of all terrestrial ecosystems. In this book, the philosopher and historian of science Jean-Marc Drouin contends that insects pose a fundamental challenge to philosophy. Exploring the questions of what insects (...) are and what scientific, aesthetic, ethical, and historical relationships they have with humanity, he argues that they force us to reconsider our ideas of the animal and the social. He traces the role that insects have played in language, mythology, literature, entomology, sociobiology, and taxonomy over the centuries. Drouin emphasizes the links between humanistic and scientific approaches—how we have projected human roles onto insects and seen ourselves in insect form. Caught between the animal and plant kingdoms, insects force us to confront and reevaluate our notions of gender, family, society, struggle, the division of labor, social organization, and individual and collective intelligence. A remarkably original and thought-provoking work, A Philosophy of the Insect is an important book for animal studies, environmental ethics, and the history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

The Stoic Epictetus famously criticizeshis students for studying Stoicism as ‘mere theory’ and encouraged them to add training to their educational program. This is made all the more interesting by the fact that Epictetus, as a Stoic, was committed to notion that wisdom is sufficient to be virtuous, so theory should be all that’s required to achieve virtue. How are we then to make sense of Epictetus criticism of an overreliance on theory, and his insistence on adding training? This paper (...) argues that this tension can be resolved through an appeal to the metaphor of ‘digesting theory’. Epictetus discusses the digestion of theory in three parts of his existent work. While the use of digestion as a metaphor for moral progress in Epictetus has been noted, an explanation as to exactly what this process consists of has yet to be provided. This paper attempts to provide such an account. I argue that digestion consists of assimilating what we have learnt conceptually, at the level of general principles, into specific beliefs concerning existent objects. I argue further that this process of digestion can only be achieved through what Epictetus calls training (askesis). (shrink)

This is a translation of Nicolai Hartmann’s article “Der Megarische und der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des ontologischen Modalitätsproblems,” first published in 1937. In this article, Hartmann defends an interpretation of the Megarian conception of possibility, which found its clearest form in Diodorus Cronus’ expression of it and according to which “only what is actual is possible” or “something is possible only if it is actual.” Hartmann defends this interpretation against the then dominant Aristotelian conception of possibility, based (...) on the opposition between dynamis and energeia, and according to which there is always an open multiplicity of simultaneous “possibilities,” the outcome of which remains undetermined. Since, according to Hartmann, reality suffers no indetermination, the Megarian conception of possibility is an account of real possibility, whereas the Aristotelian one is merely an account of epistemic possibility. (shrink)

Several lines of evidence indicate that rapid target-aiming movements, involving both the eyes and hand, can be biased by the visual context in which the movements are performed. Some of these contextual influences carry-over from trial to trial. This research indicates that dissociation between the dorsal and ventral systems based on speed, conscious awareness, and frame of reference is far from clear.

The bells tolling on 9 May 1945 were heralding peace. The question remained: what kind of peace and for whom? Thousands of us marched on a trail for many kilometers, from Mährish-Ostrau eastward, like a silent accordion, sometimes extended, sometimes compressed, chased, not knowing where we were going. The voices of the bells echoed over our column and raised hopes from whose nonfulfillment countless people would perish, not being able to bear the disappointments of the new forthcoming peace. However, it (...) was all unknown to us, we did not even know where we were going. Yet we knew where we were coming from, from the cauldron that had continuously tightened over four weeks, and from which we had definitely failed to escape on 1 May. With a wounded soldier on my back, I laid down my gun. At that point, we didn’t know yet that the Americans would hand all the prisoners that had reached the redemptive West from Bohemia and Moravia back to the Russians. So this fight had been futile and every death in vain. The dead were still lying around in countless numbers. (shrink)

Peut-on atteindre l'extériorité radicale, et, si oui, comment? Tout fonctionne comme si la racine de l'extériorité ne rencontrait jamais celle de l'intériorité. Mais que serait le monde si le monde intérieur et le monde extérieur n'avaient pas de racine commune? Serions-nous, alors, dans l'irrémédiable séparation? Dans l'indépassable solitude? Dans la totale altérité? Dans l'infinie différence et l'infinie indifférence? Problème philosophique et existentiel fondamental ; outre que l'art s y confronte en inventant ses voies. I l en va, entre autres, de (...) l'intériorité, de la subjectivité, de l'existence des choses matérielles, mais aussi de leur essence, des moyens de les connaître et des conditions de possibilité de cette connaissance et de ces moyens : quels enjeux! L'interprétation semble être la seule voie — bien périlleuse — pour représenter l'extériorité. Mais, alors, quel(s) type(s) d'interprétation? Philosophique, esthétique et poétique — les trois moments de ce livre? Le problème est donc à la fois celui de l'extériorité et celui de l'interprétation : eu égard à ses enjeux et à ses présupposés, il est incontournable. Le travailler éclaire sur l'interprétation et sur l'extériorité. (shrink)

One of the trademarks of Nicolai Hartmann’s ontology is his theory of levels of reality. Hartmann drew from many sources to develop his version of the theory. His essay “Die Anfänge des Schichtungsgedankens in der alten Philosophie” testifies of the fact that he drew from Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. But this text was written relatively late in Hartmann’s career, which suggests that his interest in the theories of levels of the ancients may have been retrospective. In “Nicolai Hartmann und seine (...) Zeitgenossen,” Martin Morgenstern puts the emphasis on contemporaries of Hartmann: Émile Boutroux, Max Scheler, Heinrich Rickert, Karl Jaspers, and Arnold Gehlen. But there is another plausible source for Hartmann’s conception of levels that has so far remained overlooked in the literature. Hartmann studied with and was influenced by Nikolai Lossky. Lossky has a theory of levels that he adopted from Vladimir Solovyov. Solovyov presents his theory of levels, among other places, in Oпpaвдaнie дoбpa, where he says that the five principal stages of the cosmogonic process of ascension toward universal perfection, which are given in experience, are the mineral or inorganic realm, the vegetal realm, the animal realm, the realm of natural humanity, and the realm of spiritual or divine humanity. This theory appears to bear significant similarities with the theory of levels of reality that Hartmann will develop a few decades later. Solovyov was widely read in Russia and it would be unlikely that Hartmann was not at least minimally acquainted with his work. Chances are that Hartmann came into contact with it in some details. An intellectual lineage could thus likely be traced from Hartmann back to Solovyov. In this paper, I document and discuss this possible lineage. (shrink)

Nicolai Hartmann was one of the most prolific and original, yet sober, clear and rigorous, 20th century German philosophers. Hartmann was brought up as a Neo-Kantian, but soon turned his back on Kantianism to become one of the most important proponents of ontological realism. He developed what he calls the “new ontology”, on which relies a systematic opus dealing with all the main areas of philosophy. His work had major influences both in philosophy and in various scientific disciplines. The contributions (...) collected in this volume from an international group of Hartmann scholars and philosophers explore subjects such as Hartmann's philosophical development from Neo-Kantianism to ontological realism, the difference between the way he and Heidegger overcame Neo-Kantianism, his Platonism concerning eternal objects and his interpretation of Plato, his Aristotelianism, his theoretical relation to Wolff's ontology and Meinong's theory of objects, his treatment and use of the aporematic method, his metaphysics, his ethics and theory of values, his philosophy of mind, his philosophy of mathematics, as well as the influence he had on 20th century philosophical anthropology and biology. (shrink)

Dans la Théorie élémentaire de la botanique, dont la première édition date de 1813, Augustin-Pyramus de Candolle se propose d’expliquer et de fonder rationnellement la méthode naturelle de classification des plantes. Pour cela, il est amené à comparer les différentes méthodes existantes. Par ailleurs, dans l’introduction, il propose une classification générale des sciences. Dans les deux cas, on retrouve un même souci de justifier le statut scientifique de la botanique.